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LANDLORD AND TENANT: IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DERIVED
FROM CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.' the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District of Columbia
Housing Regulations2 imply a warranty of habitability in the leases of
apartments and other housing covered by the regulations. Moreover,
the court suggested that even if the housing regulations did not exist,
contract principles alone imply a warranty of habitability in all leases
involving urban dwellings.3 When several tenants in an apartment
complex owned by the First National Realty Corporation withheld
one month's rent to protest alleged violations of the regulations, the
landlord filed separate actions for possession.4 The cases were heard
jointly in the Court of General Sessions which excluded evidence of
the housing code violations and entered judgment for the landlord.5
The Municipal Court of Appeals affirmed,6 citing the established
common law rule that "a landlord does not impliedly covenant or
warrant that the leased premises are in habitable condition and. . . is
not obligated to make ordinary repairs to the leased premises in the
exclusive control of the tenant"7 in the absence of an express covenant
in the lease or a statute to the contrary. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the
case to the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.'
A lease for realty has historically been considered a conveyance of
real property.' However, when inheritance rights must be settled, the
1. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Nov. 24. 1970).
2. HOUSING REGULATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1956).
3. 428 F.2d at 1080.
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45.910 (1901). Under section 45.911 the landlord could also have
sought payment of back rent. He did not do so, probably in order to avoid a counterclaim for
money damages under rule 4(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General
Sessions of the District of Columbia.
5. 428 F.2d at 1072.
6. Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
7. Id. at 838.
8. The alternatives on remand, assuming that the alleged violations were found to have
occurred, were enumerated by the court:
(1) the rental obligation was extinguished by the landlord's breach;
(2) no part of the obligation was suspended by the breach; or
(3) there was a partial suspension of the rent obligation. 428 F.2d at 1080-82.
9. See2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *317.
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interest conveyed is treated as personalty.' 0 This "hybrid character""
of leases has not only confused courts" but also has encouraged them
to emphasize "that aspect of [a lease] which leads to the desired result
in the case before the court for decision."' 3 Under traditional property
law, the tenant "assumes the risk as to the condition of the
premises""4 which he rents. Only two exceptions to this basic rule
have developed prior to Javins. The first was the implied warranty of
habitability in short-term leases for furnished dwellings. The rationale
of this exception is that short-term lessees are often unable to
adequately inspect a dwelling they wish "to enjoy . . . without delay,
and without the expense of preparing it for use."' 5 In Smith v.
Marrable,"6 when the tenant prematurely vacated a bug-infested
furnished house that he had rented for five or six weeks, the landlord
sued to recover the rent for the remainder of the lease term. The court
held for the tenant on the ground that the landlord had breached an
implied condition in the lease that the house would be habitable.' 7 The
court in Ingalls v. Hobbs8 followed the decision in Smith by holding a
lessor responsible for the poor condition of a furnished summer house.
The Ingalls court reasoned that the lessor had agretd by implication
to provide a house that was suitable for occupation by his lessees. 9
Both decisions are based upon a limited warranty implied in contract
and make no reference to statutory requirements. Pines v. Perssion 2
extended the short-term lease exception to cover leases up to one year
in duration; however, pleas for an expansion of this theory to all leases
of dwellings met no success. 2' The second exception to the assumption
of risk rule in landlord-tenant relations is a warranty of habitability
10. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 73 (3d ed. 1939).
II. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 22112] (1967).
12. E.g., Intermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 234, 90 P.2d 704, 706 (1939);
Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179,52 N.W.2d 144 (1952).
13. 2 R. POWELL, supra note I I, at 221[2].
14. Brooks v. Peters, 157 Fla. 141,145, 25 So. 2d 205,207 (1946).
15. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348,350,31 N.E. 286 (1892). See Schoshinski, Remedies of
the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519,522 (1966). Much of the theoretical
foundation of theJavins opinion appears in Professor Schoshinski's article.
16. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
17. Id. at 694.
18. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
19. Id. at351,31 N.E. at 287.
20. 14 Wis. 2d 590, I11 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
21. See McKey v. Fairbairn, 345 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d
320 (D.C. Cir. 1952). For a strong argument in support of the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine, see Judge Bazelon's.dissenting opinion in Bowles. Id. at 325.
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implied from statutory requirements. In an alternative holding, the
Pines court found that because the rented property was unfit for
occupancy under state law, a failure of consideration on the part of
the lessor freed the lessees of all responsibility to pay rent.2 State
statutes and municipal housing codes have been used to impose tort
liability on a landlord whose negligent violation of housing law
requirements results in injury to a tenant?23 Indeed, a trend now exists
in landlord-tenant law toward the establishment of implied
contractual obligations, based on statutes and housing codes, under
which every landlord must maintain the premises in a safe condition .24
This trend is reinforced by an increasing reluctance to permit tenants
to waive the landlord's statutory duties?21
Although there are no other exceptions to the assumption of risk
rule, two cases decided just prior to Javins indicate a desire to abolish
the rule entirely in favor of a contractual theory of leases embodying a
judicially implied warranty of habitability. The clear implication of
both decisions was that the presence or absence of statutory standards
of habitability would not matter. In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,6
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the "present day demands
of fair treatment" are adequate to impose upon a landlord an implied
warranty against latent, remediable defects.2? In Lemle v. Breeden 2
the lessee sought to recover a deposit and rent payment from the lessor
on the ground that the house which the lessee had rented was so rat-
infested that it was uninhabitable. This "material breach of the
implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended...
justified the [lessee's] rescinding the rental agreement and vacating the
premises." Despite the existence of opinion to the contrary," it is
likely that the sweeping language of Lemle is limited by its factual
situation. The house was furnished, and the rental agreement covered
two separate but quite short periods, totaling considerably less than a
22. 14 Wis. 2d 590,597, I11 N.W.2d 409,413.
23. See, e.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Altz v.
Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
24. See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). See also I
Pov. L. REP. 2120, at3066 (1968).
25. E.g., Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966); Buckner v.
Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Dept., Super. Ct. 1967).
26. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
27. Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273 (dictum).
28. 462 P.2d470 (Hawaii 1969).
29. Id. at 476.
30. 38 FORD. L. REv. 818, 822 (1970).
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year. Moreover, the lessee's inspection of the property was brief.31
These facts clearly resemble those in Smith, Ingalls, and Pines.3 1
In determining that the District of Columbia Housing Code
requires a warranty of habitability to be implied in the leases of all
housing subject to the code, the Javins court considered the housing
regulations as legislative manifestations of a policy favoring reform of
landlord-tenant law.3 For its reading of the housing code, the court
relied on Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co.," a tort case which
held that the housing regulations impose privately enforceable duties
upon a landlord to make such repairs as are necessary to prevent
injuries to his tenant.3 Furthermore, the court of appeals reasoned
that a housing contract was invalid unless the dwelling was in
substantial compliance with the housing code.36 The case was
remanded to determine whether violations of the housing regulations
occurred during the time rent was withheld and whether such
violations were substantial enough to excuse some or all of the
tenants' rent obligation.
The court in Javins also suggested that contract principles could
serve as the basis for implying a warranty of habitability, maintaining
that such principles would "provide a more rational framework [than
property law] for the apportionment of landlord-tenant
responsibilities . . . ,,17 While conceding that it may have been
reasonable in the past to expect the tenant to maintain his leasehold in
a habitable condition, the court argued that the shift from an agrarian
to an urban life style has stripped tenants of the resources and skills
necessary for repairing their dwellings. The court equated the modern
tenant with a purchaser of consumer goods, reasoning that "the
tenant must rely upon the skill and bonafides of his landlord at least
as much as a . . .buyer must rely upon the . . . manufacturer."3
31. 462 P.2d at471.
32. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
33. 428 F.2d at 1082.
34. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
35. See also Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "IT]he Housing Regulations
[imposed] maintenance obligations upon [the landlord] which he was not free to ignore." Id. at953.
36. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). See note 24 supra and
accompanying text.
37. 428 F.2d at 1080.
38. Id. at 1079. The opinion makes particular reference to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the principal case dealing with an implied warranty of
merchantibility for consumerproducts.
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The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant, the
need to improve existing housing, and the severe social impact of
inadequate housing were cited as additional reasons why a warranty
of habitability implied from contract principles should replace the
common law assumption of risk rule. 9
While the principal holding in Javins is squarely within the second
major exception to the assumption of risk rule, the alternative holding
lays the groundwork for a major alteration in the landlord-tenant
relationship. If contract principles permit a warranty of habitability
to be implied into all leases for urban dwellings, then any vestiges of
the assumption of risk rule in leases will be abolished. This alternative
holding is an acceptance of the developing legal theory "that a lease is
in essence not only a demise but also a sale, in the commercial sense,
of an interest in land and, more importantly, is a contractual
relationship. ' 4 There are a number of serious questions concerning
both the enforcement and consequences of such an implied warranty
based on contract principles. Not the least of these is whether local
courts will be able to develop a sufficient understanding of the
doctrine to apply it correctly. These courts must analyze the
significance of existing housing legislation and determine what sort of
relief will be granted to tenants. 41 Even when these questions are
answered, other problems still require resolution. The higher
standards will surely increase the cost of multi-family housing.
Moreover, if a landlord is sufficiently provoked, he may simply
demolish the building and use his realty for other purposes.
Abandonment of the building is also a possibility. Thus, judicial
acceptance of this new doctrine can be expected to be slow. However,
when confronted with a court reluctant to accept the implied warranty
of habitability doctrine, the aggrieved tenant has other avenues of
relief open to him .4 3 These include the revival and modification of the
39. Id. at 1079-80.
40. Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387, 399
(1967).
41. See Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS
LJ. 287,306 (1970).
42. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORD. L. REV. 225,258 (1970). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1966, at 43, col. 3, for a discussion of official attitudes toward the landlords. Slum landlords
naturally argue that their profit margins are almost nonexisent. Perhaps to the surprise of some
observers, they are often correct. The government of New York City has concluded that some
slum dwellings can never return a profit. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1964, at 1, col. I.
43. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 15, at 528-41.
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constructive eviction doctrine,44 the concept of an illegal contract
when a landlord ignores the welfare of his tenant, 5 and injunctive
proceedings by tenants acting on a private nuisance theory.46 While all
of these options provide tenants with a substantial degree of legal and
economic protection, they fall short of the implied warranty of
habitability in providing assurance that repairs to the tenant's
leasehold will actually be made by the landlord. Because tenant
remedies are "too spotty and too dependent on such extraneous
factors as the capacity to organize tenants,' 47 the importance
attached to the relative merits of the different modes of tenant action
should be tempered by a realization of their ineffectiveness relative to
concerted efforts by municipal and state authorities in the
enforcement of housing codes.48 Since criminal prosecutions for
housing violations have also often proved disturbingly ineffective, 49
the best hope for housing reform may lie in heavy economic sanctions
imposed by a civil housing court adapted specifically to the
enforcement of housing regulations."0 With nearly eight million
American families living in substandard housing,51 there is much
work for such courts.
44. See East Haven Associates, Inc. v. Gurian, 313 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1970).
45. See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 Ai2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). See notes 24 and
35 supra and accompanying text.
46. See Hedrick v. Tabbs, 120 Ind. App. 326,92 N.E.2d 561 (1950).
47. F. GRAD. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS (Nat'i Comm'n on Urban
Problems Rep. No. 14, 1968).
48. Id. at 148.
49. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1255, 1276 (1966).
50. Id. at 1281-90.
51. H.R. REP. No. 365,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
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